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It is commonly accepted that corruption is animmeasurable phenomenon. Even when we areable to identify its presence in an organisation,
we are never able to definitively quantify the extent
to which it exists. This is particularly true within
police organisations where individuals often feel
isolated from civilian communities and show
particular loyalty to their colleagues. 
Police institutions, unlike many other sectors, endow
members at the very bottom of the organisational
hierarchy with easily abused discretionary power.
Because this street level corruption tends to take
place beyond the gaze of organisational oversight, it
is unlikely that evidence of the corrupt act will
survive. As a ‘victimless’ crime in which both bribe
payer (whether monetary or otherwise) and receiver
benefit from the transaction, it is unsurprising if
neither blows the whistle. 
Of course corruption is not victimless. At the
simplest level the law has not served its intended
purpose. Additionally, police officers who solicit
bribes not to issue speeding tickets know they have
undermined the law. Perhaps they do it in isolation,
perhaps with the knowledge that their colleagues
do the same. Either way, as law enforcement
officers they are unlikely to maintain full faith in
either their own or other justice institutions, having
themselves been involved in obstructing justice. 
The same is true of the other party. Some of the
most vehement protestors about police corruption
are those who pay roadside bribes. They fail to see
themselves as active proponents of the crime,
instead laying the blame at the feet of the police
officer. As a result they too lose faith in policing
and justice institutions.1
Which ‘police’ are corrupt?
Both the corrupt cop and corrupting member of the
public (or vice versa) inevitably share their
experiences with others, leading to the creation of
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Difficulties with corruption data and reporting
Annual reports of the South African Police (SAP),
predecessor to the SAPS, are fairly scant compared
with the transparency afforded the South African
public under democratic rule. SAP reports made no
mention of internal disciplinary processes, let alone
corruption. However, as transparent as SAPS reports
may now appear, they remain at times misleading.
In 1996 the SAPS formed its first dedicated Anti-
Corruption Unit (ACU). Through this unit the public
was for the first time able to access accurate data
on organisational action against corrupt members.
During its first six years of operation the ACU was
increasingly successful in bringing to book such
members. The unit’s success peaked in 2000 when
1 048 members were arrested and charged by the
unit. 
Ironically it was the following year, 2001, that the
unit had its staff halved in a move towards its
closure in 2002. According to the SAPS, the ACU’s
function was duplicated by the organised crime unit
and should thus be located there (SAPS 2005).
Ironically in 2002, just prior to the ACU’s closure,
the head of KwaZulu-Natal’s organised crime unit
was convicted on corruption charges brought
against him through the ACU’s work.  
While in line with the restructuring the organisation
has seen since 2002, the closure of the ACU, led by
the national commissioner, has been widely
questioned by some within the SAPS as well as
many outsiders. Since the closure of the unit, the
SAPS alters the manner in which it presents
corruption related disciplinary data almost annually,
making comparisons with the ACU era almost
impossible. This is largely due to the fact that in
recent years the only available data refer to
suspensions of members rather than the arrest and
conviction based reporting implemented by the
ACU. 
Despite difficulties in comparison it seems clear
that the organised crime unit, with its broad and
busy mandate, has been unable to replicate the
ACU’s success in the sphere of SAPS corruption.
Data available from 2006/07 show a total of 222
members suspended for corruption and fraud
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 23 • MARCH 200822
hearsay-based discourses. These accounts combine
with media reports on police corruption to form a
public discourse in which all police across national,
metropolitan, municipal and traffic departments are
often painted with a single, tarnishing brush. 
The results of a nationally representative study
published in the SA Crime Quarterly in 2006 found a
direct correlation between perceptions of pervasive
police corruption and a loss of faith in the police in
South Africa (Mattes 2006). The survey suggests that
an astounding 50 per cent of the populace believe all
or most police to be corrupt. One of the only other
major surveys producing relevant data, the ISS’s 2003
national Victims of Crime survey revealed ‘traffic
fines’ and ’policing’ respectively to be the two areas
in which respondents were most likely to have been
asked to pay bribes. In both these surveys, as with
the public discourse referred to above, it becomes
unclear which ‘police’ are being referred to. 
The issuing of traffic fines is generally restricted to
provincial or city traffic officers, or to metro2 officers
where relevant. However, SAPS members are able to
issue what are known as J534 fines for traffic
violations. By the same token, other policing
activities are carried out by metropolitan, municipal
and SAPS members. As with the hearsay and media
discourses, neither of the surveys mentioned above
are clear on which police are involved in the
perceived and real corruption. 
While to some these distinctions may be irrelevant,
their importance is evident when considering that the
SAPS, each of the country’s five metropolitan
departments, and the only municipal police
department, are each independently responsible for
the management of corruption (and all other
functions) in their organisations. A brief examination
of developments in each follows below. 
Corruption and the SAPS
To be fair, when most people refer to anything to do
with ‘police’ they tend to refer to the national police
body. This makes sense considering the sheer size
and reach of the organisation across the country.
However, with the increasingly public presence of
metro police, particularly in Gauteng, this trend is
fast changing. 
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during that financial year (SAPS 2007). This must be
compared with the 1 048 corruption arrests (the
majority of which, it can be assumed, resulted in
temporary suspensions) and 193 convictions led by
the ACU in 2000 (SAPS 2002). 
The later figures reek of organisational inaction, and
inaction there has been. From 2001 to 2007 the
SAPS reported the development (and implied the
implementation) of various macro anti-corruption
strategies. In truth, rollout for what is now called the
Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan only began in
September 2007, despite it still being incomplete.3
This obscene delay, combined with the misleading
approach to reporting, raises serious questions 
about political will to tackle corruption in the
organisation. 
However, should the National Prosecuting Authority
(NPA) successfully prosecute National Commissioner
Jackie Selebi, new light may be cast on this lack of
action and aspects of the closure of the ACU, as
well as some aspects of the new Plan. In such a case
all the Commissioner’s decisions relating to
corruption management, as well as any other plans
he may have spearheaded, will need to be revisited. 
The Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan
Delays and potential concerns aside, the rollout of
the Plan must be viewed in a positive light. From
what little is known about it, it seems both
extremely complex, yet promising if fully developed
and implemented effectively.4 One of the most
exciting aspects of the Plan is its leaning towards
public education on police corruption. Through as
yet undecided means, the SAPS hopes to educate
the public about police corruption and the
mechanisms it will put in place to combat it.
Importantly, one of these mechanisms will include a
SAPS anti-corruption hotline, something else that
was lost with the ACU. 
Public education around police corruption is
perhaps the most important anti-corruption
approach, though as yet never pursued by the SAPS.
The campaign will need to be handled delicately
and in partnership with the media so that it is not
misconstrued as further evidence of apparent
rampant corruption in the organisation. 
Other promising new tools include an ‘alternatives
to corruption’ policy which will provide exit plans
to members whose hands are already dirtied by
corruption, and anti-corruption training modules
taught in both basic training, and following
promotions. 
A possibly contentious aspect of the new Plan is
that it fails to reintroduce a dedicated anti-
corruption body in the SAPS. Instead the
investigation of corruption remains with station
level detectives, with high profile cases referred to
the organised crime unit. 
While policing its own members is obviously not
the organisation’s priority, the checks and balances
that keep a democratic police agency in line
cannot be ignored. The SAPS has adopted a
community-centric approach to policing which is
heavily reliant on the presence of strong, trusting
relationships between its members and the public.
As the Afrobarometer findings referenced above
suggest, broad national trust in ‘the police’ remains
an illusive prize at this stage. 
For this to change the SAPS is going to need to
tread with careful haste in the rollout of its new
Plan. The organisation will also need to carefully
manage its response to the charges against the
national commissioner. 
Corruption and the metropolitan police
departments5
Since 2000 Durban, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni,
Tshwane and Cape Town have established
metropolitan police departments (MPDs). Swartland
in the Western Cape established the country’s only
municipal police department. Accountable to
municipal governments and tasked with crime
prevention, by-law and traffic enforcement6 within
municipal limits, MPDs are considerably smaller
than the SAPS. 
The Johannesburg MPD, the country’s largest, has a
total staff complement of 2 200 which is
proportional to 0,1 per cent of the SAPS. While for
the most part MPDs appear to exemplify an ease of
corruption management when compared with the
SAPS, they have their hands tied in some aspects of
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their work through restrictions imposed by the SAPS
National Commissioner.
With few circumstantial exceptions, MPDs do not
have the power of investigation. While many within
the MPDs consider this as a hindrance to their
work, the absence of detective services means one
of the most fertile grounds for corruption is absent
from the organisations. SAPS detectives might ‘lose’
dockets or parts thereof, alter statements, plant or
destroy evidence, or any other number of actions in
return for reward. In this regard MPD officers might
be seen as less corruptible than SAPS members. 
However, the area of traffic enforcement in which
the majority of citizens will encounter metro police,
is one in which corruption is most visibly rife.
Because corrupt traffic related exchanges span a
greater proportion of the population, affecting the
wealthiest to the poorest (rather than the SAPS who
often disproportionately police the poor), it is one
of the more public and damaging forms of
corruption. 
Tackling traffic related corruption will be extremely
important when the Administrative Adjudication of
Road Traffic Offences Act (AARTO) is implemented.
AARTO is a license points demerit system through
which traffic violations will result in license demerit
points and suspensions, in addition to fines. After a
decade in the making, a pilot of the system will be
rolled out in Tshwane in 2008. 
While it has the potential to revolutionise traffic
enforcement for the better, many within MPD
management believe it will increase the prevalence
of bribery and corruption among their officers. The
logic follows that if motorists are willing to pay
bribes to avoid monetary fines, they will be more
willing to pay bribes to avoid the loss of points
which could lead to the suspension of their
licenses. 
Effective integrity and anti-corruption management
within the MPDs and other traffic policing agencies
will be vital if this system is to be effective. While
all but the Swartland Municipal Police Service
(SMPD) have anti-corruption related units, none has
any formal anti-corruption or integrity management
policy, strategy or training, and few have any
functionally relevant structures outside of these units.
MPD anti-corruption related units
Within the MPDs there exist three basic models of
anti-corruption unit. The Johannesburg (JMPD),
Ekurhuleni (EMPS), Tshwane (TMPD) and Cape Town
MPDs (CTMPD) all have anti-corruption related
units.7 For the most part these units are reactive in
nature, sharing a general mandate to investigate all
complaints (including those not deemed corruption
related) against members of their respective
organisations. 
In 2007 the JMPD introduced a ‘proactive’
subsection to its unit. These investigators are tasked
with visiting offices and officers to conduct spot
firearm, ticket book, process adherence and other
systems checks. This function is similar to what the
TMPD calls its Inspectorate. The TMPD’s
Inspectorate monitors and assesses all departmental
processes and conducts spot checks to measure
adherence and uncover irregularities. If foul play is
suspected, a case will be referred to their anti-
corruption unit. 
The TMPD also has a unique Civilian and Internal
Affairs Unit mandated to advise TMPD managers
with regards to civil claims, disciplinary and
departmental action against employees, and to
provide pre-emptive legal assistance for operations.
The TMPD is currently moving to combine these
three anti-corruption related units into a single
Integrity Unit. 
Durban’s MPD is unique in its current approach to
combating corruption. While it previously had an
anti-corruption unit, this was closed in 2007 and its
function (but not members) moved to the city’s
Ombudsman’s office. This is the only example of
corruption investigation capacity located outside the
city’s police department. While the importance of an
independent unit is clear, the fact that investigators
are unfamiliar with the police environment, and that
the office’s capacity was not increased when taking
on this role, is concerning. 
The Swartland MPD does not have any dedicated
anti-corruption structures. All complaints and
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investigations are headed by the chief or his deputy.
This is understandable considering the uniquely
small size of the MPD (46 members) operating in a
peri-rural, small town environment. According to
Swartland’s chief, the MPD has not received a
single corruption complaint.
While there is as yet no clear best practice among
the different MPDs’ approaches to anti-corruption
units, a number of points stand out. It makes sense
that related functions are located within a single
unit and that this unit is positioned outside the
department or in the office of the chief. It is also
vitally important that the inspectorate-type function
is fulfilled by all units, signalling a proactive drive
against corruption. Ideally such a proactive drive
would include monitoring of officers on the road,
though at present this is only done by the JMPD.
MPD perceptions, structures and challenges
Top management within all of the MPDs consider
corruption a serious challenge. However, almost
none of the units tasked with combating it share
these views. Most point to the relatively few
corruption related complaints they receive to
illustrate the health of their organisations. While not
a focus of this article, most MPD civilian oversight
committees, none of which is concerned about
corruption, adopt the same attitude. 
This argument flies in the face of public opinion
and survey results and would only be valid if anti-
corruption reporting and investigation structures
existed, functioned and were advertised to the
public. In such a scenario the whistleblower would
know who to call and would feel safe doing so, the
MPD would respond swiftly, justice would be
served, and complaint figures would rise before
declining. The same would happen if MPD
employees were educated about, and encouraged,
to report misconduct amongst colleagues, or if anti-
corruption type units were proactive in their
functions. This is not the case. 
None of the MPDs have structures or guides for
blowing the whistle on corrupt colleagues and
none, with the exception on the JMPD, runs any
form of public education campaign relating to
corruption. The JMPD is the only MPD with a
dedicated anti-corruption hotline, impressively
advertised on all its vehicles. The JMPD and DMPD
are also the only MPDs to introduce driver
identification and vehicle tracking technologies to
help ensure personal accountability should a
whistleblower refer to a particular vehicle when
reporting corruption. 
One of the most aggressively proactive forms of
combating police corruption – the field integrity test
– is not readily available to South African MPDs.
Through such a test, anti-corruption officers posing
as members of the public would cajole officers into
potentially engaging in corruption. While such
strategies raise obvious ethical questions, the
knowledge that officers may be set up would likely
deter many. However, due to complications around
applying for entrapment orders from the Director of
Public Prosecutions, this strategy is not available to
MPDs unless a credible complaint against an officer
arises. It is for this reason that the EMPD’s Integrity
and Standards Unit views lack of entrapment
powers as its greatest hindrance. However,
entrapment orders and the resulting video and
audio evidence of a corrupt act are only necessary
for criminal prosecution. Councils should be able to
take their own disciplinary action, based on
evidence gathered without such an order. At present
this does not happen.
Additional challenges
Perhaps the greatest hindrance to the governance of
integrity in the MPDs is the disciplinary code.
Unlike the SAPS, which has a code separate from
that of other civil servants, MPD employees are
governed by the same code as all council
employees. In other words, firearm wielding, fast
car driving individuals with immense discretionary
power are liable to the same disciplinary definitions
and punishments as secretaries, human resource
managers and grounds staff. 
Infringements are not considered within a policing
context but in a civilian, council context. For
example a ‘lost’ firearm would be treated as ‘lost
council property’, not as the loss of a lethal
weapon. Furthermore, disciplinary action is taken
by council rather than by the MPD, further
removing the misconduct from the policing context.
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In all but the JMPD, only councils can handle
expulsions. 
No case history or law exists to guide MPD
discipline. MPD employees receive very different
punishments for the same acts across time and
departments. 
With little control over discipline, MPDs complain
of councils drawing procedures out to the extent
that blatantly guilty employees are allowed to return
to work based on the legally stipulated three-month
maximum suspension preceding disciplinary action.
The result is that officers who have been caught
red-handed remain unpunished within their original
positions while councils prepare to hear the case. 
A solution to this situation would seem to lie in the
development of a new disciplinary code in line with
that of the SAPS rather than that of council, and the
shifting of disciplinary management to within the
departments. Ideally, MPDs would also develop and
share precedents on the punishment of offences,
and in so doing educate employees about the
consequences of illicit self-enrichment.
The fact that MPD investigators do not have the
criminal investigative powers of SAPS detectives
also has a negative effect on the manner in which
MPDs approach corruption. Criminal corruption
investigations against MPD offenders must be
handed over to already overburdened SAPS
detectives. Solid cases are then at risk of being
neglected and eventually withdrawn by senior
prosecutors. Even when an MPD unit has gathered
the necessary statements and evidence to convict
officers, progress often slows once dockets are
handed to the SAPS. 
Again, this can result in blatantly guilty officers
returning to work after the maximum three-month
suspension. In order for this to change, the SAPS
National Commissioner needs to appoint MPD
investigators in terms of the Criminal Procedure and
SAPS Acts, endowing them with the powers vested
in these acts. Similarly, the inability to trap officers
without prior orders issued by the Director for
Public Prosecutions restricts the independence and
power of MPD units in seeking out corrupt officers. 
Conclusion
Discourses on ‘police’ in South Africa seldom
differentiate between the country’s national,
metropolitan and municipal police. As such, the
Afrobarometer and ISS Victims of Crime surveys,
among others, make it difficult to determine the
extent to which MPDs influence public perceptions
of ‘police’. While such distinctions may not be of
paramount concern, they are worth considering
when scrutinising management within the different
organisations.
Perceptions of corruption in the country’s policing
bodies negatively undermine the entire policing
fraternity. As such, these disparate bodies with
mostly separate management systems and structures
might consider working together on corruption,
among other management issues. While proactive,
healthy relationships already exist between most of
the MPDs and the SAPS (at a senior management
level), it would seem that much could come from
closer cooperation in the future. The SAPS could
share much with the MPDs in terms of its detailed
Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan. By the same
token, the MPDs’ relevant anti-corruption units
might stand as models that the SAPS may choose to
replicate.
Both the SAPS and MPDs lack publicly familiar and
effective corruption reporting mechanisms. More
importantly, advertising of hotlines and reporting
procedures, where they exist, does not seem
widespread. Given that the development of such
resources and advertising can be costly, particularly
in the context of local government budgets, it
would seem logical for the country’s policing
institutions to pool their resources in publicising
anti-corruption structures. This would need to be
managed effectively so as to encourage whistle
blowing against offenders whilst not bolstering
negative perceptions of police. Additional partners
could be found in the National Anti-Corruption
Forum and Public Service Commission, among
others. 
The simplest strategy would be a well marketed
campaign (including television or radio
commercials) advertising a national police anti-
corruption hotline.8 Call centre employees would
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direct complaints to relevant organisations, units or
stations. In addition to ease of use, this would allow
for the centralisation of complaints within a single
database through which oversight bodies could
follow up on action taken. 
This option is particularly favourable in light of the
SAPS’s future plans to embark on a public anti-
corruption campaign. This campaign, through
partnerships with the media, would also benefit
from publicising the arrests and prosecutions of
members of the public involved in police
corruption, which would hopefully arise through a
proactive policing of officers and their engagements
with the public.  
Other important issues that need to be addressed
are the disciplinary code within the MPDs, the lack
of investigative powers granted MPD officers and
the SAPS’s failure over the past seven years to
effectively implement any relevant strategies. If
these issues can be checked, the country’s police
will have made an important step towards restoring
their credibility. 
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Endnotes
1 In a bizarre manipulation of the justice system based on 
the country’s climate of police corruption, the
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department alleges that
some motorists falsely accuse EMPD officers of
soliciting bribes in order to evade legitimate traffic
penalties. Such a claim would have appeal if it were
institutionally accepted that corruption is pervasive. 
2 For ease of reading, the terms ‘metro’ and ‘MPD’ will
refer to both metropolitan and municipal police.
3 SAPS strategic management reports that a national 
instruction was issued by the national commissioned for
the rollout of the strategy in September 2007, although
this claim has not been independently verified. 
4 For more detail on the Corruption and Fraud Prevention 
Plan see Faull, A 2007. Corruption and the South
African Police Service, A Review and its Implications.
ISS Occasional Paper 150. Pretoria: Institute for Security
Studies. Despite regular correspondence with the
developers of the Plan at the time of writing, the pace at
which the Plan continues to change means that some
early SAPS goals presented in the paper are no longer
valid.
5 Information in this section was gleaned through 
interviews with senior management, heads of relevant
units and where possible, oversight committees in the
following departments: SAPS, Johannesburg
Metropolitan Police Department, Tshwane Metropolitan
Police Department, Cape Town Metropolitan Police
Department; Durban Metropolitan Police Service,
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Service and Swartland
Municipal Police Service. Interviews were conducted
between 26 October 2006 and 1 October 2007.
6 In the last quarter of 2007 Cape Town relocated its 
traffic enforcement outside of the Cape Town
Metropolitan Police Department in a separate Traffic
Department. 
7 For ease of reading I refer to the TMPD’s ‘Internal 
Conduct Investigations Unit’ and the EMPS’s ‘Integrity
and Standards Unit’ by the same name used by the
JMPD, an ‘Anti-Corruption Unit’. All three have very
similar functions. 
8 Alternately advertisements for the current national anti-
corruption hotline could be made which then include
reference to police corruption.
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